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The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role 
transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements 
(IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full 
potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop 
a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We 
propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and 
making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our 
transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment 
model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce 
almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty. 
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1. Introduction 
Transfers play a prominent role in the analysis of self-enforcing international environmental 
agreements (IEAs). There are two reasons why this is not surprising. First, large asymmetries 
in the cost and benefit structure between countries may lead to a highly asymmetric 
distribution of the gains from cooperation that may hamper successful treaty-making. Second, 
IEAs provide a public good and therefore face strong free-rider incentives that might be miti-
gated through the use of transfers. A review of current literature (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1998; Finus, 2001, 2003a and Tulkens, 1998) suggests that contributions in this field can be 
broadly divided into two categories.  
The first category analyzes IEAs using the tools of cooperative coalition theory. The analysis 
is based on the characteristic function that assigns a worth to every coalition, which is 
calculated as the aggregate payoff that a coalition can secure for its members irrespective of 
the configuration of the players remaining outside this coalition. As well as testing whether 
the coalition including all players (grand coalition) is stable (in the sense of the core, for 
example), the main focus is on the axiomatic foundation of normatively motivated sharing 
schemes such as the Nash bargaining solution, the Shapley value and the Chander-Tulkens´ 
transfer scheme. Applications are found in the context of global warming (Chander and 
Tulkens, 1995, 1997; Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003; Germain et al., 1998), acid rain (Germain 
et al., 1996; Kaitala et al., 1995), high seas fisheries (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Lindroos, 
2004; Lindroos and Kaitala, 2001, Pintassilgo, 2003) and water management (Ambec and 
Sprumont, 2002; Lejano and Davos, 1999). This approach may be regarded as the classical 
cooperative method of studying coalitions. The strength of this approach lies in the generality   2
of results that can often be established on the basis of some standard properties, like 
superadditivity.
5 
The second category of contributions analyzes IEAs using the tools of non-cooperative coali-
tion theory. The analysis is based on the valuation function that assigns an individual payoff 
to every coalition member. The value is calculated by taking into account the entire coalition 
structure, i.e. the partition of players inside and outside a coalition. The main focus is on 
explaining free-riding behavior in the context of externalities, identifying the main economic 
factors that determine the relative success of partial cooperation and suggesting instruments 
for discouraging free-riding. The advantage of the non-cooperative over the cooperative 
approach is that it better captures externalities between players and coalitions (Bloch 2003). 
However, this advantage comes at the cost of complexity, implying that results are usually 
less general. 
In the context of the non-cooperative approach, transfers have been analyzed in their ex-ante 
and ex-post forms.
6 Ex-ante means that countries commit to a certain transfer rule before they 
decide upon their participation in an IEA. Ex-post means that after an agreement has formed, 
transfers are used to broaden an existing coalition.  
The first putative paper on transfers goes back to Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). In line with 
intuition, they prove that transfers have no effect in the standard model with symmetric coun-
tries, given the constraint that all IEAs must be self-enforcing and that transfers must be self-
financed. They proceed to analyze various forms of commitment that will enable coalitions to 
expand via ex-post transfers. They suggest two directions of ex-post transfers that may 
improve upon the status quo: 1) insiders (coalition members) “bribing” outsiders (non-coali-
                                                 
5   Roughly speaking, supperadditivity means that the worth of coalitions increases with increasing 
participation. See section 3 for a formal definition. 
6   For an overview, see Finus (2003).   3
tion members) to join their coalition and 2) outsiders “bribing” other outsiders to join the 
coalition.  
The idea of various forms of commitment and ex-post transfers was also pursued in later 
papers by Botteon and Carraro (1997), Jeppesen and Andersen (1998) and Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas (1996), though commitment is certainly not an assumption in line with the notion 
of self-interested players. Therefore, it was important to illustrate that expansions of coalitions 
via ex-post transfers may also be possible without commitment as this has been done by 
Botteon and Carraro (1997) in a simple empirical model with five heterogeneous countries. 
Moreover, the positive effect of ex-ante transfers was illustrated for the Nash bargaining 
solution and the Shapley value. A similar conclusion was confirmed by Barrett (1997) for the 
Shapley value using a stylized simulation model where heterogeneity was limited to two types 
of countries.  
Later papers have looked at the effect of various ex-ante and ex-post transfers rules on the 
success of coalition formation and on the possibility of expanding stable coalitions (see 
Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2004; Bosello et al., 2003, 2004; Carraro and Siniscalco, 
2001; Eyckmans and Finus, 2003, 2004a; Finus et al., 2004; Weikart et al., 2004). Most of 
these papers used a more elaborate empirical model, looked not only at stylized transfer 
schemes derived from cooperative game theory, but also considered schemes that are based 
on various moral motives for “fair sharing”, that considered transfers via permit trading and 
allowed for the possibility of multiple coalitions. Roughly speaking, all papers basically 
confirm earlier studies  in concluding that transfers can be conducive to the success of self-
enforcing agreements, but that outcomes crucially depend on the particular transfer rule, the 
model and the data set. For instance, Barrett (2001) draws a rather pessimistic picture of the 
Chander-Tulkens´ transfer rule in the context of a non-cooperative coalition model, whereas 
Eyckmans and Finus (2003) come to a more optimistic conclusion. Moreover, Bosello et al.   4
(2003) find some evidence that equitable sharing rules can enhance efficiency by increasing 
the number of signatories of an environmental treaty, whereas Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 
(2004) derive the exact opposite conclusion.  
The mixed evidence and the specific results motivate us to look for a more general and rigor-
ous approach to studying the role of transfers in the context of non-cooperative coalition 
theory. In particular, we want to determine the “full potential of transfers”. To this end, we go 
back to the roots of the analysis of IEAs, removing in this paper any unnecessary 
complication as a first step. That is, we assume a simple cartel formation game and apply the 
concept of internal and external stability. We do not consider commitments or any 
complication like non-transferable utility (Buchholz and Konrad 1995), monitoring and moral 
hazard problems (Petrakis and Xepapadeas 1996); “reputation effects” (Jeppesen and 
Andersen; 1998; Hoel and Schneider 1997) are also discarded in favour of the notion of 
optimal transfer schemes. With optimal transfers we mean transfers designed to maximize 
global welfare under the constraint that the underlying IEA is self-enforcing. 
In what follows, we present our model in section 2. This comprises not only a theoretical part 
but also an empirical part in order to illustrate the usefulness and practical application of our 
concepts. The empirical part is based on a modified version of RICE, a well-known integrated 
assessment model of climate change policy (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). In section 3, we 
introduce two properties of coalition formation that are suitable for analyzing all aspects of 
transfers in section 4. Section 5 wraps up the main findings and highlights some directions for 
future research.    5
2. Model 
2.1 Theoretical  Background 
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. There are n players N {1,...,n} =  that are 
countries or world regions in our empirical model and which we simplify refer to as countries 
in the following discussion. In the first stage, countries choose their membership: a country 
can either join coalition S and become a signatory or remain a singleton and non-signatory. 
These decisions lead to coalition structure C {S,{ },...,{n}} = l , i.e., a partition of players, with 
s  signatories (s denotes the cardinality of S) and n-s non-signatories. Given the simple 
structure of the first stage, a coalition structure C is fully characterized by coalition S.
7 
In the second stage, countries choose their economic strategies. In the context of our empirical 
model, economic strategies are emission abatement and capital investment (see subsection 2.2 
for details). At this stage, it suffices to denote the vector of economic strategies by 
1n (S) ( (S),..., (S)) ω= ω ω , given that a coalition S has formed in the first stage; we can also 
note that in the second stage countries receive individual payoffs  i(( S ) ) π ω  that depend on the 
economic strategies of all countries.
8 
We compute the subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-stage game by backward induction. 
To do this, it is sufficient for strategies to constitute a Nash equilibrium at every stage. For the 
                                                 
7   This simplification would not be possible if we were to allow for multiple non-trivial coalitions 
as for instance considered in Bosello et al. (2003, 2004), Carraro (2000), Eyckmans and Finus 
(2003) and Finus (2003b). 
8   This simple theoretical framework has often been adopted in the literature on international 
environmental agreements where the assumption of a coalition structure with a single coalition is 
the most obvious and realistic and where the game is characterized by positive externalities. A 
more general framework is sometimes used in coalition theory (Bloch, 2003) but would not be 
useful for the purpose of  showing our main results.    6
second stage, this entails that economic strategies  form a Nash equilibrium between coalition 
S and the n-s non-signatories.
9 That is: 
** *
iS S iS S S iS iS ( (S), (S)) ( (S), (S)) (S) −− ∈∈ πω ω ≥ πω ω ∀ ω ∑∑  and  
                    ( 1 )  
iS ∀∉ : 
** * * *
iS i i iS i i i ( (S), , (S)) ( (S), (S), (S)) (S) −− πω ωω ≥ πω ω ω ∀ ω . 
where  S(S) ω  is the economic strategy vector of coalition S,  S(S) − ω  the vector of all other 
countries not belonging to S,  i (S) ω  the strategy of non-signatory i, and  i(S) − ω  the strategy 
vector of all other non-signatories except i under coalition structure S. An asterisk denotes 
equilibrium strategies. Computationally, this implies that non-signatories iS ∉  will choose 
their economic strategies so as to maximize their individual payoff  i() πω, whereas all 
signatories  iS ∈  jointly maximize  i iS () ∈ π ω ∑ , the aggregate payoff of their coalition. 
Strategically, this means that the behaviour of non-signatories towards all other countries is 
selfish and non-cooperative; signatories behave cooperatively towards their fellow members 
(otherwise cooperation would not be worthwhile analyzing), but non-cooperatively towards 
outsiders. Economically, this means strategies are group (but not globally) efficient within 
coalition S. Hence, the equilibrium economic strategy vector 
*(S) ω  corresponds to the 
classical “social or global optimum” if coalition S comprises all countries (S=N), i.e. the 
grand coalition forms, and corresponds to the classical “Nash equilibrium” if coalition S 
comprises only one member (s={i}). Hence, any inefficiency, i.e., global welfare loss of 
coalition S compared to the global optimum stems from the fact that S is not the grand 
coalition. 
                                                 
9   This has been called a partial agreement Nash equilibrium by Chander and Tulkens (1997). Our 
assumption is in line with the mainstream of the literature on coalition theory. For an overview 
see Bloch (2003) and Yi (2003).   7
Given that the second stage of the game has been solved, we define 
*
ii v (S) ( (S)) =π ω  as the 
valuation of country i if coalition S forms. This definition succinctly summarizes all 
information relevant  to the second stage. 
For the first stage, we define a Nash equilibrium in terms of participation.
10 The following 
two conditions must be met: 
internal stability:  ii v( S ) v( S\ { i } ) ≥  iS ∀ ∈ .              (2) 
external stability:  ii v( S ) v( S { i } ) ≥∪  iS ∀ ∉ .              (3) 
That is, in equilibrium, no signatory belonging to coalition S has an incentive to leave its 
coalition in order to become a non-signatory, given the participation decisions of all other 
countries. By the same token, no non-signatory has an incentive to join coalition S, given the 
decisions of all other countries. 
Regardless of whether we consider ex-ante or ex-post transfers, in a TU-framework, optimal 
economic strategies are not affected by transfers. Thus, valuations with transfers  i ˆ v( S ) a r e  
related to those without transfers  i v (S) simply through the relation  ii i ˆ v (S) v (S) t =+  where 
i t0 >  means receiving and  i t0 <  means paying a transfer. We make the standard assumption 
that transfers balance, i.e.,  i iN t0 ∈ = ∑  and hence  ii iN iN ˆ v( S ) v( S ) ∈∈ = ∑ ∑ .
11 Note that in any 
case (with and without transfers), coalition S={i} is always internally stable and coalition 
S=N always externally stable, which simply follows by definition. 
                                                 
10   This definition of coalitional stability is due to d´Aspremont et al. (1983) and has been frequently 
applied in the literature on IEAs as for instance by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), 
Hoel (1992) and by many scholars afterwards. 
11  The condition that transfers balance is equivalent to the self-financed transfer constraint in 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).   8
2.2 Empirical  Background 
In order to illustrate the importance of transfers for the success of coalition formation, we 
derive valuations from the CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (hereafter abbreviated as 
CWSM). CWSM is an integrated assessment, economy-climate model that extends the 
seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
12 It captures the endogenous feedback of 
climate change damages on production and consumption. The economic module of the 
CWSM consists of a dynamic, long-term, perfect foresight, Ramsey-type optimal growth 
model. The environmental module consists of a carbon cycle and temperature change module. 
The decision variables in the CWSM are investment and carbon emission reduction. 
In the CWSM, the world is divided into six regions: USA,  JPN (Japan), EU (European 
Union), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Union) and ROW (Rest of the World). In every 
region i, and at every time t, the following budget equation describes how “potential GDP”, 
i,t Y , can be “allocated” to consumption,  i,t Z , investment,  i,t I , emission abatement costs, 
i,t i i,t YC ( ) µ , and climate change damages,  i,t i t YD (T ) ∆ : 
( ) ( ) i,t i,t i,t i,t i i,t i,t i t YZIY C Y D T =+ + µ + ∆                 ( 4 )  
Output  i,t Y  is produced with capital and labor. Capital is built up through investment and 
depreciates at some fixed rate. Labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. Therefore, 
investment  i,t I  is the only endogenous production input and constitutes the first choice 
variable in the model. 
Abatement costs  () i,t i i,t YCµ  are expressed as “loss of potential GDP”: Ci is the share of 
“potential GDP” devoted to abatement, which is a function of  [ ] i,t 0,1 µ∈ , a variable that 
                                                 
12  An overview of the equations and parameters with a detailed exposition of the model can be 
found in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003).   9
measures the relative emission reduction compared to the business-as-usual scenario without 
any abatement policy. Damages  ( ) i,t i t YD T ∆  are also expressed as “loss of potential GDP”: 
Di is the share of “potential GDP” destroyed by climate change damages, which is a function 
of temperature change ∆Tt. Temperature change depends on the stock of greenhouse gases, 
which in turn depends on emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere. Finally, emissions are 
proportional to production, but can be reduced by the abatement rate  i,t µ . Hence, the second 
choice variable in this model is the emission abatement rate  i,t µ .  
Both choice variables (investment and abatement) affect output, abatement costs, damage 
costs and therefore also consumption, not only domestically but also abroad. This is 
immediately evident with regard to abatement because remaining emissions (after abatement) 
increases the stock of greenhouse gases, which affects environmental damages in every coun-
try. However, it is also true for investment, since capital is an input in the production process 
and emissions are proportional to production. Technological progress is captured by the 
CWSM in an exogenous fashion (the time path is taken from RICE). It increases  production 
potential  and decreases the emission-output ratio (i.e. increases energy effiency) over time. 












∑                    ( 5 )  
where  i ρ  stands for the discount rate of region i, Ω denotes the time horizon and ω is an 
economic strategy vector. Vector  i,t i,t i N;t 0, , {I , }∈ =Ω ω=µ K  consists of a time path of 35 
decades
13 for emission abatement and investment for all six regions and hence its length is 
2x35x6=420. For every possible coalition S, we compute the open-loop Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
13    We choose a sufficiently long time period to avoid „end point bias”. However, due to 
discounting, only a shorter period is strategically relevant for players.    10
*(S) ω  in order to derive valuations 
*
ii v (S) ( (S)) =π ω  as described in subsection 2.1. Given 
that our empirical model comprises six players, we have 58 different coalitions and therefore 
a full table of valuation vectors of dimension 58x6. If valuations are modified through 
transfers, this happens in a one-shot fashion since it does not affect equilibrium economic 
strategies in the CWSM as proved in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003). Thus, we are operating 
within a TU-framework.   
We finish this section with five remarks about the basic incentive structure obtained by   
calibrating the CWSM. First, we assume a relatively low discount rate of 1.5 percent, except 
for CHN and ROW where we assume a discount rate of 3 percent in order not to 
“overestimate” the incentives for these regions to implement climate change policies. 
However, much higher discount rates would simply ignore the long term effects of climate 
change, providing no incentive for countries to cooperate and therefore would render our 
analysis uninteresting. The discount rates chosen are in line with the recommendations in 
Weitzman (2001).  
Second, the parameters set for the CWSM imply that USA, JPN and EU face steep abatement 
cost curves, while CHN and ROW face flat ones. The regional differences in abatement costs 
mainly reflect differences in energy efficiency. Intuitively, energy efficient regions face 
higher marginal costs when cutting back emissions than regions characterized by low energy 
efficiency because they have already exploited the cheapest energy saving techniques.  
Third, damage functions are particularly steep in EU and ROW,  less steep  in USA and JPN 
and relatively flat in FSU and CHN. The high damage estimate (as a percentage of “potential 
GDP”) for ROW is due to the fact that climate change is believed to affect developing 
countries more strongly than industrialized countries, because their economies tend to depend 
more on climate related production processes like agriculture, fishery and forestry (IPCC   11
2001). The low damage estimate for FSU is due to some expected benefits from moderate 
temperature increase, like the increased availability of arable land. 
Fourth, in a given coalition S, the steeper the marginal damage cost curves and the flatter the 
marginal abatement cost curves of the members of S are, the higher the optimal abatement of 
coalition members will be, which follows from the first-order conditions of joint welfare 
maximization of coalition S (see Barrett, 1994 and Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003). It follows 
that in any period, coalition members should abate up to the point where their marginal 
abatement costs are equal to the discounted sum of all coalition members’ avoided future 
marginal climate change damages. 
Fifth, coalition members with a flatter marginal abatement cost curve have to contribute more 
than those with a steeper curve, all else being equal, which also follows from the first order 
conditions (cost efficiency) of coalition S. 
 
3. Properties  of  Valuations 
In this section, we discuss two important properties that hold for the valuations derived from 
our empirical model CWSM and which determine the general incentive structure of countries 
in the coalition formation game. The first property is called superadditivity and means that the 
aggregate valuation of country j and coalition S increases if country j joins coalition S. 
Property 1: Superadditivity 
A coalition game is superadditive if and only if for all  ⊂ SN  and  ∉ jS : 
    ∈∪ ∈ ∪> + ∑ ∑ ii j iS { j } iS v(S {j} ) v(S) v(S).  
 
That is, there is “coalitional gain” from cooperation and hence cooperation is “group rational” 
or “coalitionally rational”. It is evident that superadditivity is a necessary condition to make   12
cooperation attractive for those countries participating in an IEA. This property means that 
starting from any coalition S and increasing the degree of cooperation by moving to S {j} ∪  or 
even larger coalitions, it is generally possible to allocate the coalition gain such that it consti-
tutes a Pareto-improvement to all regions involved in cooperation.
14 
We can define the second property with the term positive externalities, meaning that if 
country j joins coalition S, all countries that do not belong to S {j} ∪  are better off. 
Property 2: Positive Externalities 
A coalition game exhibits positive externalities if and only if for all  ⊂ SN ,  ∉ j S  and all 
∉∪ S{ j } l :  ∪> v( S {j } ) v( S) ll .  
 
Consequently, there is an “external gain” or a positive spillover from cooperation, making 
free-riding attractive. From a non-signatory´s point of view, the most favorable condition is 
the one in which all other countries participate in the agreement.
15 
It is then clear that a region’s decision to join a coalition – as well as the stability of an IEA – 
depends on the intensity of the superadditivity effect which, together with the sharing rule of 
the coalitional gain, determines the inside options of cooperation relative to the intensity of 
the positive externality effect which in turn determines the outside options of cooperation. We 
will study these effects in more detail in section 4, but note here that superadditivity and 
positive externality together imply that global welfare increases through cooperation. That is, 
given a coalition S, whenever a single or several countries join coalition S, global welfare is 
                                                 
14    Superadditivity is a property frequently encountered in cooperative coalition theory, but not 
much used in non-cooperative coalition theory, despite the fact that it helps to structure ideas 
immensely. 
15   Positive (and negative) externalities is a property that plays an important role in  recent literature 
on non-cooperative coalition theory. See for instance Bloch (2003), Yi (2003) and Maskin 
(2003).   13
raised. That is, cooperation is globally rational - a central property that motivates our effort of 
analyzing measures to mitigate the problems of free-riding in transboundary pollution control. 
Table 1 illustrates the magnitudes at stake for our empirical application using the CWSM 
model. It displays – for a selection of coalitions – welfare (global welfare) and two 
environmental variables (carbon concentration and global emissions) in absolute (in the 
legend) and relative terms (in the table). The relative magnitudes can be interpreted as a 
“closing the gap index”, measuring how close a coalition comes to the global optimum where 
the performance in the global optimum is 100 percent and the performance with no 
cooperation is 0 percent by definition. Apart from stressing that both full and partial 
cooperation can make a large difference in welfare and ecological terms compared to no 
cooperation, Table 1 illustrates that not only the size of a coalition matters for the global 
success of cooperation, but also the identity of its members. Put differently, the commonly 
held view that high participation automatically indicates the success of an IEA may be wrong. 
For instance, coalition no. 32 including five members (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) ranks 
lower than many coalition structures comprising coalitions of only three or four members and 
even lower than coalition no. 31 with only two members (JPN and ROW).  
From Table 1, it is also clear that, as a general tendency, the importance for global welfare of 
participation of particular countries decreases with the following sequence: ROW, CHN, EU, 
USA, FSU and JPN. ROW´s and CHN´s important role stems from the fact that they can pro-
vide cheap abatement. Similarly, JPN´s lesser importance is due to its steep marginal 
abatement cost curve. However, there is also an additional dimension related to environmental 
damages. If a given coalition maximizes its joint welfare, the higher the marginal damages of 
coalition members are, the higher joint abatement efforts will be, all else being equal. This 
explains the importance of EU for cooperation. These remarks also explain why the “old 
Kyoto coalition” – comprising USA, JPN, EU and FSU – in our model ranks relatively low   14
since the two key players – CHN and ROW – are outsiders. A similar conclusion applies to 
the “present Kyoto coalition”, after the withdrawal of the USA in 2001. It is evident that the 
US decision implies a dramatic drop in welfare and environmental effectiveness, almost to 
non-cooperative levels. Thus, our model provides support for the efforts of many 
governments and non-governmental organization to convince the US to rejoin the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, it also provides support for the concern of the US and many others that an 




4. Stable  Coalitions 
In this section, we use  the CWSM model to identify stable coalitions of the climate game 
under the alternative assumptions of no transfers and (various forms of) transfers. To gain an 
understanding of the driving forces, it is important to recall that stability is defined by two 
components – internal and external stability – and that valuations are characterized by 
superadditivity as well as positive externalities. Moreover, it is helpful to note that the 
positive externality property implies that a necessary condition for internal stability is 
individual rationality. Individual rationality, also sometimes called profitability (see Carraro 
and Siniscalco, 1993), means that every coalition member iS ∈  receives at least the same 
valuation in coalition S as it does under conditions of no cooperation ( ii iS : v ( S )v ( { i } ) ∀ ∈≥ . 
In other words, a minimum requirement for coalition S to be internally stable (and therefore 
stable) is that cooperation should, for all members of S, constitute a (weak) Pareto-
improvement compared to no cooperation. The reason is simply explained. Suppose a 
                                                 
16   Similar conclusions can also be found in Buchner et al. (2002) where an integrated economy-
climate model based on RICE is also used. The main difference is that in the model used by 
Buchner et al. (2002) technical change is endogenous.    15
member i in S would receive a lower valuation than under no cooperation, i.e., 
ii v( S ) v( { i } ) < . If region i were to leave coalition S, it would receive valuation  i v( S\ { i } ) f o r  
which  ii v( S\ { i } ) v( { i } ) ≥  holds (with strict inequality if s3 ≥ ) due to positive externalities. 
Consequently, leaving coalition S would always pay and therefore S could not be internally 
stable. 
4.1 No  Transfers 
In the case of no transfers, only 11 out of 58 coalitions are individually rational in our CWSM 
model analysis (see Table  2). None of the top 20 ranked coalitions (in terms of global 
welfare) is individually rational. No coalition with 5 members and only one with 4 members 
is individually rational (see Table 2). Neither the “old” (no. 47) nor the present (no. 50) Kyoto  
coalition is individually rational. Notably, not a single coalition that includes China – the key 
player with cheap abatement options – is individually rational. Thus, in the absence of 
transfers, although cooperation may be coalitionally (because of superadditivity) and globally 
(because of superadditivity and positive externality) rational, it may not be individually 
rational to all coalition members. The reason is that an efficient allocation of abatement 
burdens within a coalition S would result in a highly asymmetric allocation of the net gains 
from cooperation among coalition members that face a markedly heterogeneous benefit and 
cost structure. For instance, the EU has a relatively steep marginal abatement and marginal 
damage cost curve. Therefore, if the EU is a member of a coalition S, it will be a major 
beneficiary of cooperation, because it contributes relatively little to cooperation, but in 
proportion benefits more. The opposite is true for China, which faces a flat marginal 
abatement cost and damage cost curve and which therefore is a typical loser from cooperation 
without transfers. 
Thus, even a simple check for individual rationality indicates that without transfers a key 
player like China cannot be convinced to join a climate treaty. Moreover, we can already   16
conjecture that without transfers even moderate partial cooperation will prove very difficult. 
This is confirmed by a detailed analysis of internal and external stability as shown in Table 2. 
The two individually rational coalitions with the highest global welfare (no. 21 and 22) are 
not internally stable, though all other individually rational coalitions are internally stable. 
However, none of the internally stable coalitions is also externally stable. Hence, there is no 
stable coalition without transfers when valuations are derived from the CWSM model (see 
also Table 3).  
4.2  Ex-Ante Transfer Schemes 
In the light of the above  negative conclusion, we consider different ex-ante transfer schemes. 
That is, the membership decision in the first stage of the game is based on the assumption that 
coalition S will not only choose its optimal economic strategies in the second stage, but will 
also allocate the coalition gain from cooperation among its members with a particular transfer 
scheme. From section 2, we may recall that  ii i ˆ v( S ) v( S ) t = +  and that transfers balance, i.e., 
i iS t0 ∈ = ∑  and hence  ii iS iS ˆ v( S ) v( S ) ∈∈ = ∑ ∑ . 
We start by considering three transfer schemes that have played an important role in previous 
analyses of self-enforcing IEAs (see the literature cited in the Introduction). We call these 
schemes “simple” in order to distinguish them from our “optimal” transfer schemes that we 
introduce subsequently. Through the illustration of both optimal and simple transfer schemes, 
the full potential of an optimal design of transfers will become apparent. 
4.2.1  Simple Transfer Schemes   
All three simple transfer schemes that we consider originate from cooperative coalition 
theory. Nevertheless, they have been frequently adopted in the context of the valuation 
function approach. This requires only a slight modification of their original definitions to 
account for the fact that coalition S may not only be the grand coalition but can be any   17
subcoalition of N. The following formulas describe valuations of player i being a member of a 
given coalition SN ⊆ . 
The first transfer scheme is the Shapley Value and implies valuations of the following form: 
SV
ik k
TS kT{ i } kT
iT
t!(s t 1)! ˆ vv ( T { i } ) v ( T ) i S
s! ⊆∈ ∪ ∈
∉
⎡⎤ −−
=∪ − ∀ ∈ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
∑∑∑            (6) 
with coalition SN Í , T S ⊆  a subgroup of S and t and s the size of group S and T. Roughly 
speaking, the Shapley  Value gives every country a valuation according to its marginal 
contribution to every possible subcoalition T of S (term between square brackets in (6)), 
weighted by the probability that this subpartition forms (first factor in (6)).  




1 ˆ vv ( { i } ) v ( S )v ( { i } ) i S
s ∈∈
⎡⎤
=+ − ∀ ∈ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
∑∑                ( 7 )  
Every member in S receives its valuation under no cooperation (first term) plus an equal share 
of the coalitional surplus compared to no cooperation (second term). Thus, no cooperation 
serves as the threat point. 
The third simple transfer scheme is the Chander and Tulkens’ transfer scheme in the version 
as applied in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003): 
'
CT i
ii j j '
jS jS j
jS








              ( 8 )  
with 
'
i D  discounted marginal damages of member i. It is evident that this scheme is a version 
of the Nash bargaining rule with unequal weights. This rule gives a higher share of the gains 
from cooperation to those that are most affected by climate change.    18
It is straightforward to show that all three simple transfer schemes are all coalitionally 
rational, i.e.  S N ∀⊆ :  jj jS jS ˆ v( S ) v( S ) ∈∈ ≥ ∑∑ , and individually rational, i.e.,  i S ∀∈ : 
ii ˆ v( S ) v( { i } ) ≥  since superadditivity holds.  
Tables 2 and 3 confirm our intuition and also many previous studies on transfers: simple 
transfers improve upon the outcome without transfers. However, it is important to realize that 
this result is by no means general. Of course, all simple transfer schemes guarantee individual 
rationality, but individual rationality is only a necessary condition for internal stability. 
Though this is not the case for our data set, in a different model it may be possible that a 
coalition is stable without transfers and leads to a higher global welfare than any other stable 
coalition with a simple transfer scheme. Already from Table 2, it can be seen that there are 
three coalitions of size 3 that are internally stable without transfers, but none under the 
Shapley Value and the Chander and Tulkens’ transfer rule. Similarly, no general conclusion is 
possible with respect to external stability either.  
Moreover, in our application, the Nash bargaining solution leads to a stable coalition (no. 16) 
with higher global welfare than in any other stable coalition under the other two transfer 
schemes. However, other models could yield different results. Finally, we have no 
information about whether we could do any better than the Nash Bargaining solution and if so 
what the “best” transfer scheme would be and which coalition could be achieved. 
4.2.2  Optimal Transfer Schemes
17 
In order to address the issues raised above in a systematic way, we first focus on internal 
stability. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of a “Potentially Internally Stable 
                                                 
17   Formal proofs of all theoretical claims in this subsection can be found in Eyckmans and Finus 
(2004b).   19
Coalition” (PISC) which we define as follows (see Eyckmans and Finus, 2004b and Botteon 
and Carraro, 1997 for a similar concept):  
Definition 1: Potentially Internally Stable Coalition (PISC) 
A coalition S is said to be potentially internally stable (PIS) if and only if 
ii iS iS v(S) v(S\{i} ) ∈∈ ≥ ∑∑ . 
 
Thus, if a coalition S is not PIS, this simply means that there is no transfer scheme that can 
ensure internal stability to all members of S and hence this coalition cannot be stable. 
Conversely, if a coalition S is PIS, then this means that coalition S has sufficient resources to 
prevent a coalition member from leaving coalition S. Thus, what is required now is to 
construct a transfer scheme that ensures internal stability to all members of S, provided S is 
PIS. Given the design of most simple transfer schemes, it seems appropriate to construct a 
transfer scheme that gives every member of S its outside option  i v (S\{i}) plus a share of the 
coalition surplus compared to the free-rider valuation: 
Definition 2: Optimal Transfer Schemes (OPTS) 
A transfer scheme can be termed optimal if it satisfies  
∀⊆ ∀ ∈ SN , i S :  
OP
ii i j j jS jS ˆ v( S )v ( S / { i } ) ( S ) v ( S ) v ( S \ { i } ) λ ∈∈ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑   
with  { }
−
+ ∈ ∈= ∈ = ∑
s1 s
j jS (S) 1 λ∆λ λ  . 
 
By the construction of OPTS, it is easy to see that any transfer scheme that belongs to the 
class of OPTS will make any PISC internally stable. The design of OPTS suggests that we 
have much leeway in choosing weights  i(S) λ . What is important is  to choose the “correct” 
threat point (first term of the definition of 
OP
i ˆ v( S )  in Definition 2) and define the coalition   20
surplus (second term of the definition of 
OP
i ˆ v( S )  in Definition 2) such that coalitional rational-
ity holds, which is the case since 
OP
ii iS iS ˆ v( S ) v ( S ) ∈∈ = ∑∑ . Note that if S is not PIS, then total 
coalitional payoff is insufficient to satisfy the free-riding claims of all members of S and the 
transfer scheme becomes a loss sharing instead of a surplus sharing formula.  
It is evident that any transfer scheme that belongs to the class of OPTS will lead to the same 
set of internally stable coalitions. Less evident but interesting is that this “robustness result” 
also carries over to the set of externally stable coalitions. This is because for any OPTS, either 
a coalition S is internally stable for all members (if it is PIS) or fails to be internally stable for 
all members (if it is not PIS).  
More specifically, pick a coalition S and suppose S is PIS. Then, under any OPTS, S is 
internally stable for all coalition members, i.e.,  iS : ∀ ∈  
OP
ii ˆ v( S )v ( S \ { i } ) ≥  by the very 
definition of PIS and OPTS and regardless of the particular sharing vectors l .  
Suppose now that S is not PIS. Then, following a similar line of argument, under OPTS for all 
iS ∈ , all coalitions S\{i} are externally stable with respect to accession of region iS ∈  
because coalition members receive less than their free-riding payoff  i v (S\{i}), regardless of 
the particular sharing vectors l . Therefore, any family of weights of an OPTS will lead to the 
same set of internally and externally stable coalitions.  
As is clearly confirmed by Table 2,  every coalition that is internally stable under a simple 
transfer scheme will also be internally stable under an optimal transfer scheme, but not vice 
versa. This is not true however for external stability. For instance, coalition no. 16 is 
externally stable under Nash Bargaining, but is not externally stable under an optimal transfer 
scheme. Hence, one may wonder whether some effort should be made to search for a transfer 
scheme that achieves not only internal, but also external stability in an “optimal way”. A 
closer inspection of the underlying fundamentals reveals that this is not necessary. First, if   21
coalition S is not externally stable against accession of player j, then coalition S {j} ∪  is inter-
nally stable with respect to a withdrawal of j. This follows simply from the definition of 
stability (see subsection 2.1). Second, we know from above that if S {j} ∪  is internally stable 
with respect to a withdrawal of j, it is also internally stable for all other members of S {j} ∪  
under OPTS. Third, due to superadditivity and positive externalities, global welfare of coali-
tion S {j} ∪  is higher than global welfare of coalition S. Thus, we do not need to worry about 
external stability from a global point of view. In particular, we can conclude that the coalition 
with the highest global welfare among all PISC, say 
* S , is also externally stable. (If 
* S  were 
not externally stable, then there would exist a larger PISC with higher global welfare, 
violating the initial assumption that 
* S  generates the highest global welfare.) 
To sum up, any transfer scheme that belongs to the class of OPTS leads to the same set of 
internally and externally stable coalitions. Thus, results are robust and independent of specific 
distributional weights. Moreover, any OPTS exploits the full potential of self-enforcing 
cooperation. The coalition with the highest global welfare among the potentially internal 
stable coalitions will be stable.  
The importance of these findings are evident from Table 2 and 3. In our application, the three 
simple transfer schemes lead to very different equilibria. Under the simple transfer schemes, 
the Nash Bargaining solution generates the highest global welfare (with 68.2 percent of total 
maximum welfare), whereas OPTS achieves 94.5 percent of total maximum welfare for 
coalition no. 5 {USA, EU, CHN, ROW}, which is the coalition yielding the highest global 
welfare among all PIS coalitions.   22
We finish this subsection with two general observations. First, there always exists a stable 
non-trivial coalition under OPTS.
18 In contrast, under no transfers or simple transfer schemes, 
a stable non-trivial coalition may fail to exist, though this applies only to the no transfer case 
in our application with the CWSM model. Second, there is no general guarantee that all 
coalitions are individually rational under OPTS, whereas this is the case for all simple transfer 
schemes. However, this poses no problem: (i) all coalitions that are PIS are internally stable 
under any OPTS and therefore individually rational due to the positive externality property 
and (ii) coalitions that are not PIS might not be individually rational but they cannot be 
stabilized anyway.
19  
4.3  Ex-Post Transfer Schemes 
In this subsection, we consider ex-post transfers. This means that after a coalition has formed, 
transfers are used to modify the status quo. The status quo is a stable coalition that has 
emerged from the coalition formation process based either on no transfers or on some ex-ante 
transfer scheme.
20 In our application, the status quo is represented by the stable coalitions 
listed in Table 2 and 3. The status quo can be modified using transfers to expand a coalition S. 
Following Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), we cite two cases. In the first case, a coalition S 
uses transfers to expand its agreement by “bribing” outsiders to join the coalition (subsection 
                                                 
18   Due to superadditivity, all coalitions with two members are internally stable under OPTS. If one 
of them is externally stable, the claim is obvious. If none of them is externally stable, then there 
exist larger coalitions that are internally stable. Again, if they are externally stable, the claim is 
confirmed and if not, then there are even larger coalitions that are internally stable. The argument 
continues, noting that at least the grand coalition is externally stable by definition. 
19   This explains why in the column denoted by “#IR” in Table 2, no exact numbers can be given 
under OPTS - this would require us to assume a particular set of weights. 
20   It will become evident below that our arguments also apply to a wider interpretation of the status 
quo, which also includes non-stable coalitions.   23
4.3.1); in the second case, an outsider  j S ∉  uses transfers to bribe another outsider kS ∉  to 
join coalition S. Again, we impose budget neutrality, meaning that transfers must balance. 
4.3.1  Expansion of Coalitions Through Internal Means 
The standard procedure to analyze the expansion of coalitions through internal means is to 
pick a stable coalition (see Botteon and Carraro, 1997). For instance, in the case of the Nash 
Bargaining solution, one may pick coalition no. 16. Subsequently, we check to see whether 
expansion of coalition S is possible, where current members of S compensate an outsider j for 
joining their coalition. It can be argued that expansion is possible if and only if 1) the 
expansion constitutes a Pareto-improvement to all members of S and 2) the enlarged coalition 
S{ j } ∪  is internally stable. The first requirement follows from the presumption that current 
members of S will only bribe outsider region j to join if they are better off once it does so. 
The second requirement simply follows from the definition of stability.  
The first requirement means that 
iS ∀∈ :  ii i v( S { j } ) t v( S ) ∪+ ≥             ( 9 . a )  
   jj j v( S { j } ) t v( S ) ∪+ ≥           ( 9 . b )  
and the second requirement that 
iS : ∀∈   ii i v ( S{ j } )t v ( S{ j } \ { i } ) ∪+ ≥ ∪        ( 1 0 . a )  
   jj j v( S { j } ) t v( S ) ∪+ ≥                        (10.b) 
must hold where typically  i t0 ≤  and  j t0 ≥ . By adding (9.a) and (9.b), summing over all 
regions S{ j } ∪  involved in the expansion and noting that  i iS{ j } t0 ∈∪ = ∑ , we get  
ii
iS{ j } iS{ j }
v( S { j } ) v( S )
∈∪ ∈∪
∪≥ ∑∑   .              ( 1 1 )    24
Condition (11) is a necessary condition for (9) to hold and may be called Potentially Pareto-
Improvement (PPI). However, by consulting Definition 1, it is evident that this condition is 
nothing else than the condition of superadditivity. Since we know that superadditvity holds in 
our global emission game, PPI is a non-binding constraint.
21  
A similar manipulation of the second requirement reveals that a necessary pre-requisite for 
condition (10) to hold is  
ii
iS{ j } iS{ j }
v( S { j } ) v( S { j } \ { i } )
∈∪ ∈∪
∪≥ ∪ ∑∑            ( 1 2 )  
which is nothing other than the condition of potential internal stability (PIS). Hence, 
expansion from coalition S is possible if there exists a coalition S {j} ∪  that is PIS.  
Given these remarks, the analysis of coalition expansions is straightforward since all 
theoretically and empirically relevant information is already known from the previous 
subsection 4.2 on ex-ante transfers. More specifically, we can argue as follows. 
Which coalitions qualify as potential candidates for expansion? All coalitions that are PIS and 
which are indicated in bold in Table 2 under OPTS. In contrast, under simple transfer 
schemes, not all potential candidates are known and the choice of the coalition from which 
expansion begins may be arbitrary. 
From which of the potential candidates is expansion actually possible? From all that are not 
externally stable because this means that coalition S {j} ∪  is PIS. In contrast, under a simple 
transfer scheme, we cannot conclude that if S is externally unstable, then S {j} ∪  is internally 
or potentially internally stable. Of course, if we know that if S {j} ∪  is internally stable, 
S{ j } ∪  is PIS and hence an expansion from S to S {j} ∪  is possible. However, if S {j} ∪  is 
                                                 
21   It is evident that this is also true for any TS ⊆ .   25
not internally stable, we cannot conclude anything under a simple transfer scheme, so we are  
required  to make an additional check  (12), namely whether S {j} ∪  is PIS.  
Finally, and probably most importantly: should we be concerned about expansions from a 
global welfare point of view? Not really! The coalition with the highest global welfare among 
PISC is internally and externally stable as we argued in subsection 4.2. Hence, no expansion 
via internal means is possible from this coalition. Thus, the introduction of the concept of 
optimal transfer schemes renders the analysis of ex-post transfers via internal means 
redundant. As regards expansion via internal resources for our data set, it follows that we 
cannot do better than coalition no. 5. 
4.3.2  Expansion of Coalition by External Means 
We now turn to the question of whether the expansion of a coalition S is possible through 
external means. This means that an outsider kS ∉  “bribes” another outsider  j S ∉  to join  
coalition S. Stable coalitions for which expansions via internal means are not possible are the 
best, although not exclusively, potential candidates for expansions via external means.
22 From 
the previous subsection, we know that the condition of Pareto-improvement is not binding in 
the context of superadditivity. Therefore, we can concentrate on the condition of potential 
internal stability. By assumption, we know that if S is internally and externally stable, then 
under OPTS, S {j} ∪  is not PIS. Consequently, expansion is only possible if and only if the 
enlarged coalition receives sufficient transfers to compensate for the lack of PIS and, in 
addition, the external player is better off despite providing these resources. That is, the 
conditions: 
                                                 
22   Indeed, as long as expansion via internal means is possible, outsiders will benefit for free from 
expansion through positive spillovers, knowing that expansion is in the interest of all current 
members of coalition S.   26
ii i
iS{ j } iS{ j } iS{ j }
v ( S{ j } ) t v ( S{ j } \ { i } )
∈∪ ∈∪ ∈∪
∪+ ≥ ∪ ∑∑ ∑        ( 1 3 . a )  
kk k v( S { j } ) t v( S ) ∪+ ≥                            (13.b) 
must hold where typically  ij t, t 0 ≥  and  k t0 ≤  and due to budget neutrality  i iS{ j }{ k } t ∈∪ ∪ ∑ . 
That is, the positive externality effect accruing to region k –  kk v( S { j } ) v( S ) 0 ∪− ≥  –  must 
be larger than the free-riding effect –  ii iS{ j } iS{ j } v( S { j } \ { i } ) v( S { j } ) 0 ∈∪ ∈∪ ∪− ∪ > ∑ ∑  – when 
coalition S is expanded to coalition S{ j } ∪ .  
Figure 1 shows all possibilities of expansion from coalitions with four members that are stable 
in our application. Figure 1 illustrates that from coalition no. 5, which is the coalition with the 
highest global welfare under any ex-ante OPTS or that can be achieved via ex-post transfers 
using internal means, no expansion via external means is possible. However, from some other 
coalitions with four members, expansion that raises global welfare is possible. It is interesting 
to note that only the US and the EU are potential candidates that have sufficient resources to 
pursue a unilateral policy of “bribing” other countries to participate in a climate agreement. 
Given that coalition no. 5 can already be achieved without external means, it is only JPN, 
FSU and the US that should pursue such a policy in the interest of the global good, though 
among this group only the US has the means and the incentive to do so.   
More generally, our results stress that - in the context of problems from free-riding - countries 
can play an important role, even if they do not actively participate in an IEA. By subsidizing 
emission abatement projects abroad, those outsiders might help the receiving country to 
comply with the requirements of the IEA and hence, to become a formal member of it. The 
results also question the standard classification of the “good” and “bad” guys in international 
environmental policy and open up the road for alternative efficient strategies. These results 
may be useful for the design of future IEAs and in particular for  post-Kyoto negotiations.    27
In our application, a “degree of optimality” of 95.6 percent (coalition no. 4 comprising all 
countries except USA) can be achieved by means of a clever transfer strategy - a far more 
optimistic result than the one obtained from most models, though, of course, full participation 
cannot be achieved since expansion via external means that there remains at least one 
outsider. 
 
5. Summary  and  Conclusions 
The recent literature on international environmental agreements has largely neglected the role 
of transfers as a tool to enhance participation in international treaties. The few existing results 
on transfers and international environmental agreements (IEAs) are very specific and do not 
exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making.  
In this paper, we have proposed a transfer mechanism that is capable of maximizing global 
welfare provided the underlying IEA is self-enforcing. This result can be achieved by using 
either ex-ante or ex-post transfers where in the latter case we distinguished between internal 
and external transfers. We have also analyzed the relationships between different types of 
transfers and provided a comprehensive analytical framework to address the issue of transfer 
design in international agreements. For example, we have shown that ex-post internal 
transfers are redundant if ex-ante transfers are appropriately designed. By contrast, ex-post 
external transfers can help to achieve a welfare improving, self enforcing IEA (compared to a 
situation without ex-post transfers). 
To show the relevance of the theoretical results and the feasibility of the transfer scheme in 
actual negotiations, we used a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change 
policy to identify the agreement that would emerge at the equilibrium and how the transfer 
scheme may be able to induce all or almost all countries to sign a climate treaty. Our 
empirical results highlight the difficulty of reaching an effective agreement on climate policy,   28
because of the large asymmetries across countries and of the incentives to free-ride on the 
provision of a public good like climate change control. However, we also showed that the 
situation can be largely improved by adopting an appropriate transfer scheme. After transfers, 
all countries are better off, global welfare is close to the optimum and emissions are 
drastically reduced. We highlighted that transfers may be paid both by signatories and by non-
signatories. In the former case, we proposed an “optimal” transfer scheme that leads to far 
better results than the “simple” transfer schemes well-known in exisiting literature. In the 
latter case, we demonstrated that it is possible to reach a self enforcing agreement involving 
all but one country (e.g., USA in our empirical climate model) but where this outsider 
contributes financially, in its self interest, to stabilize a successful agreement.  
The latter result has important implications for post-Kyoto climate policy negotiations. They 
highlight the important role that outsiders like the USA can play. Although they did not ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol and may not even join this agreement at a later stage, they might 
nevertheless be involved in future protocols via new financial mechanisms through which 
they could sponsor developing countries to assume quantitative emission ceilings and to 
become a full member of the Protocol. These transfers may well be in the interest of the USA 
if the resulting increase in global greenhouse gas emission control and ensuing reduction of 
climate change damages outweighs the cost of the transfers and the cost of taking domestic 
emission control measures. 
Although our numerical results are obtained using a specific model of the global economy, in 
the paper we have also identified the theoretical mechanisms which explain our main 
conclusions. These results depend only on very general properties of the underlying valuation 
functions, in particular superadditivity and positive externalities. Therefore, we could claim 
that our theoretical results are likely to hold for most models of transboundary pollution 
control (indeed, this is the case for the model used in Bosello et al. 2003) or even for other   29
types of international public good provision problems (like for instance disease control or 
fighting international terrorism). Of course, the particular coalition structures that can be 
made self enforcing will always depend on the parameterization of the simulation models. 
The analysis of this paper could be extended both from a theoretical and an empirical 
viewpoint. A theoretical analysis would be necessary to analyze the role of transfers for 
example when multiple coalitions can form or when uncertainty characterizes the coalition 
formation game. The relationship between the optimal transfer scheme proposed in this paper 
and the transfers scheme implicit in the implementation of an emission trading market is also 
worth additional research (see Bosello et al. 2004 for some preliminary numerical results). An 
empirical analysis would be useful to test the robustness of our policy conclusions to other 
model specifications, different parameterizations or regional disaggregation.   30
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Table 1: Welfare and Ecological Implications of Different Coalitions* 
Coalition 





1  6  Grand Coalition  
(Full Cooperation)  100.0  100.0  100.0 
2  5  USA, EU, CHN, FSU, ROW  99.1  92.2  93.0 
3  5  USA, JPN, EU, CHN, ROW  96.6  90.0  91.1 
4  5  JPN, EU, CHN, FSU, ROW  95.6  80.6  81.9 
5  4  USA, EU, CHN, ROW  94.5  82.0  83.2 
6  5  USA, JPN, CHN, FSU, ROW  93.2  73.2  74.8 
7  4  EU, CHN, FSU, ROW  91.3  72.3  73.6 
8  4  JPN, EU, CHN, ROW  89.6  69.8  71.5 
9  4  USA, CHN, FSU, ROW  87.4  64.1  65.7 
10  4  USA, JPN, CHN, ROW  85.9  61.8  63.9 
11  3  EU, CHN, ROW  84.0  60.7  62.6 
12 3  USA,  CHN,  ROW  78.8  52.0  54.3 
13  4  JPN, CHN, FSU, ROW  78.4  50.3  52.6 
14  5  USA, JPN, EU, FSU, ROW  70.3  66.0  67.1 
15  4  USA, EU, FSU, ROW  69.1  61.0  62.0 
 …  …  ...  ...  ... 
31 2  JPN,  ROW  46.4  24.7  26.8 
32  5  USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU  31.0  26.9  27.5 
33  4  USA, EU, CHN, FSU  29.0  24.5  25.0 
… …  …  ...  ...  ... 
47  4  USA, JPN, EU, FSU („old Kyoto“)  5.07  1.58  2.14 
… …  …  ...  ...  ... 
50  3  JPN, EU, FSU (“present Kyoto”)  2.9  0.7  1.0 
… …  …  ...  ...  ... 
57 2  JPN,  EU  0.6  0.2  0.3 
58  1  Only Singleton Coalitions  
(No Cooperation)  0.0  0.0  0.0 
* N°: coalition number according to welfare ranking. Size: number of coalition members. Membership: 
composition of coalition. Welfare: global welfare expressed in relative terms: 
() ()
NN PN FN
ii ii i1 i1 (w (c ) w (c )) / (w (c ) w (c )) == −− ∑∑  where welfare is discounted lifetime consumption inte-
grated over 1990-2300, global welfare with full cooperation is 
N F
i i1 w( c) = ∑ =339,831 bill US$1990 (billion 
US dollars expressed in 1990 levels), global welfare with no cooperation is 
N N
i i1 w( c ) = ∑ =338,060 bill 
US$1990 and global welfare with partial cooperation is denoted by 
N P
i i1 w( c) = ∑ . Concentration: atmospheric 
carbon concentration M at time t=2300 expressed in relative terms: 
NP NF (M(c ) M(c ))/(M(c ) M(c )) −−  
where concentration with full cooperation is 
F M(c )=1912.907 GtC (giga tons carbon), concentration with 
no cooperation is 
N M(c ) =4550.202 GtC and concentration with partial cooperation is denoted by 
P M(c ) . 
Cumulative Emissions: cumulative emissions of carbon over time interval 1990-2300 expressed in relative 
terms: 
NP NF (CE(c ) CE(c ))/(CE(c ) CE(c )) −−  where cumulative emissions with full cooperation are 
F CE(c ) =772.529 GtC, cumulative emissions with no cooperation are 
N CE(c ) =1593.398 GtC and 
cumulative emissions with partial cooperation are denoted by 
P CE(c ) .  
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Table 2: Stable Coalition Structures Under Different Transfer Schemes 
Size Coalitions  #S  #IR  #IS #ES
No Transfers 
6  1  1 0 0  1 
5  2,3,4,6,14,32  6 0 0  3 
4  5,7,8,9,10,13,15,18,19,21,33,34,35,37,47  15 1  0  3 
3  11,12,16,17,20,22,23,24,25,28,36,38,39,40,41,44,48,49,50,51  20 4  3  3 
2  26,27,29,30,31,42,43,45,46,52,53,54,55,56,57  15 5  5  2 
1  58  1 1 1  0 
Shapley Value 
6 1 1  1  0  1 
5 2,3,4,6,14,32 6  6  0  4 
4 5,7,8,9,10,13,15,18,19,21,33,34,35,37,47 15  15  0  6 
3 11,12,16,17,20,22,23,24,25,28,36,38,39,40,41,44,48,49,50,51  20 20  0  4 
2  26,27,29,30,31,42,43,45,46,52,53,54,55,56,57  15 15 15  1 
1  58  1 1 1  0 
Nash Bargaining 
6 1 1  1  0  1 
5 2,3,4,6,14,32 6  6  0  3 
4 5,7,8,9,10,13,15,18,19,21,33,34,35,37,47 15  15  0  3 
3 11,12,16,17,20,22,23,24,25,28,36,38,39,40,41,44,48,49,50,51  20 20  2  2 
2  26,27,29,30,31,42,43,45,46,52,53,54,55,56,57  15 15 15  0 
1  58  1 1 1  0 
Chander-Tulkens 
6 1 1  1  0  1 
5 2,3,4,6,14,32 6  6  0  6 
4 5,7,8,9,10,13,15,18,19,21,33,34,35,37,47 15  15  0  10 
3 11,12,16,17,20,22,23,24,25,28,36,38,39,40,41,44,48,49,50,51  20 20  0  10 
2  26,27,29,30,31,42,43,45,46,52,53,54,55,56,57  15 15 15  5 
1  58  1 1 1  0 
AITS 
6 1 1  ?  0  1 
5 2,3,4,6,14,32 6  ?  0  6 
4  5,7,8,9,10,13,15,18,19,21,33,34,35,37,47 15  ?  10  15 
3  11,12,16,17,20,22,23,24,25,28,36,38,39,40,41,44,48,49,50,51  20 ? 18  0 
2  26,27,29,30,31,42,43,45,46,52,53,54,55,56,57  15 ? 15  0 
1  58  1 ? 1  0 
Bold faced means internally stable, underlined means externally stable, italic means NOT Individually Rational 
coalitions. Numbers refer to ranking according to global welfare. #S: number of coalitions of particular size, #IR: 
number of Individually Rational coalitions, #IS: number of Internally Stable coalitions, #ES: number of 
Externally Stable coalitions. For the AITS scenario, it is impossible to determine Individual Rationality without 
knowing the weights of the particular AITS transfer scheme. 
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Table 3: Stable Coalition Structures Under Different Transfer Schemes* 




  1 
Grand Coalition  
(Full Cooperation)  6  100.00  100.00  100.00 
No Transfers  -  -  - -  -  - 
Shapley 27  CHN,ROW  2 54.57  21.36  25.19 
Nash Bargaining  16  CHN,FSU,ROW  3 68.21  39.15  41.63 
26  EU,ROW  2 57.42  40.79  42.11 
27  CHN,ROW  2 54.57  21.36  25.19 
29  USA,ROW  2 54.07  35.18  36.70 
30  FSU,ROW  2 47.18  26.75  28.41 
Chander-Tulkens 
31  JPN,ROW  2 46.39  24.72  26.80 
5  USA,EU,CHN,ROW  4 94.50  81.96  83.18 
7  EU,CHN,FSU,ROW  4 91.17  72.26  73.61 
8  JPN,EU,CHN,ROW  4 89.41  69.75  71.53 
9  USA,CHN,FSU,ROW  4 87.31  64.08  65.75 
10  USA,JPN,CHN,ROW  4 85.99  61.80  63.91 
13  JPN,CHN,FSU,ROW  4 78.28  50.29  52.58 
15  USA,EU,FSU,ROW  4 68.96  61.02  62.01 
18  USA,JPN,EU,ROW  4 66.80  59.47  60.54 
19  JPN,EU,FSU,ROW  4 66.12  53.62  54.78 
AITS 
21  USA,JPN,FSU,ROW  4 64.67  48.90  50.21 
  58 
Only Singleton Coalitions 
(No Cooperation)  1  0.00  0.00  0.00 
* The same legend as with Table 1 applies.  
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